The Penumbra of Right of Privacy

With the dawn of technology in the legal system, it has come to our attention that the access to the names of the parties in a legal proceedings decided by the Supreme Court are just a click away. As such, their identities are openly divulged to the public eyes whether the said parties were the aggrieved or the defendants, the current technology will not distinguish. As a result, it may cause public scrutiny and public humiliations to the concern individuals.

The question now is whether the parties to the case may invoke their right to privacy and thereafter ask the legal repositories to stricken their names or identities in the case decided by the Supreme Court.

The 1987 Constitution protects the citizens on the right to information which has two important aspects, first, the right of the individual not to have private information about himself be disclosed and, second, the right of an individual surveillance and intrusion. These doctrines serve as our armament in our daily lives with respect to the exercise of our Constitutional right. May these doctrines be considered as absolute rules? 

The answer is probably no.

In one of the publications in Harvard Law Review which was written by Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis entitled The Right to Privacy, originally published in 4 Harvard Law Review 193 (1890), the authors ratiocinated that, “It remains to consider what are the limitations of this right to privacy, and what remedies may be granted for the enforcement of the right. To determine in advance of experience the exact line at which the dignity and convenience of the individual must yield to the demands of the public welfare or of private justice would be a difficult task; but the more general rules are furnished by the legal analogies already developed in the law of slander and libel, and in the law of literary and artistic property”.

First. The right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest.

Second. The right to privacy does not prohibit the communication of any matter, though in its nature private, when the publication is made under circumstances which would render it a privileged communication according to the law of slander and libel.

Third. The law would probably not grant any redress for the invasion of privacy by oral publication in the absence of special damage.

Fourth. The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts by the individual, or with his consent.

Fifth. The truth of the matter published does not afford a defense.

Sixth. The absence of "malice" in the publisher does not afford a defense.

The remedies for an invasion of the right of privacy are also suggested by those administered in the law of defamation, and in the law of literary and artistic property, namely: --
  1. An action of tort for damages in all cases. Even in the absence of special damages, substantial compensation could be allowed for injury to feelings as in the action of slander and libel.
  2. An injunction, in perhaps a very limited class of cases

Finally, in the case of Ople vs Torres 293 SCRA 141, the High Court opined that “Public concern” like “public interest” is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these affects their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen”. Thus, parties to the cases decided by the Supreme Court under ordinary circumstances may not invoke their right to privacy as armor in their pursuit to remove their names in the High Court’s decisions.

DISCLAIMER: The author is neither a lawyer nor is giving a legal advice on the matter. This is just an academic requirement in the college of law.